ESSAYS

CIVIL WAR

Is the West ensnared in a cycle of Repetition Compulsion?

Sigmund Freud once described repetition compulsion as an unconscious urge to reenact unresolved conflicts, often to achieve mastery or resolution. Since 1979, the West has embarked on a significant political endeavor by initiating a “foreign human rights policy” without a thorough analysis of the diverse cultural and political structures, literacy rates, social structures, and religious beliefs—or lack thereof—in various regions or countries. Despite global technological advancements, the world today is markedly different yet not necessarily improved or more stable. In fact, the world has experienced increased turmoil, with more killings, wars, and violations of human rights. Many nations, once considered laboratories for human rights, now suffer under increasingly authoritarian and ideological governments that oppress their citizens with iron fists. Even the West, the initiator of these policies, finds itself powerless, entangled in multilateral wars, insurgencies, civil wars, and sectarian killings. Let’s explore this issue more deeply.

Armed Conflict: A broad legal term used in international humanitarian law (IHL), referring to any situation of prolonged armed violence between organized parties, where resort to armed force occurs. It is divided into two main categories: International Armed Conflict (IAC), which involves two or more states, and Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), which occurs within a single state between government forces and organized non-state armed groups, or between such groups themselves. The threshold for an armed conflict is met when there is a certain intensity of violence and organization of the parties involved, triggering the application of rules like the Geneva Conventions.

Civil War: Typically, a subset of NIAC, this term describes a high intensity, sustained, and organized violent conflict within a single country between the state (or its armed forces) and one or more organized non-state actors (e.g., rebel groups), or between rival factions vying for control of the government or territory. It often involves large-scale fighting, regular armed forces, and significant societal disruption, but lacks a universally agreed-upon legal definition—it’s more of a political or descriptive term.

Scope and Parties Involved

Armed conflicts can occur on an international scale, involving disputes between different nations, such as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Alternatively, they can be non-international, involving factions within a single state. In contrast, civil wars are inherently intra-state conflicts, where internal factions—often divided by political, ideological, or ethnic lines—vie for control over the state, pursue secession, or fight for ideological dominance.

Legal Framework and Intensity Threshold

The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) sets a lower threshold for armed conflicts, requiring only the presence of organized groups engaged in sustained hostilities. Civil wars, however, demand a higher level of intensity. They involve prolonged and organized combat, significant territorial control, and the operation of non-state actors in a manner akin to a government. Typically, a conflict must exceed 1,000 battle-related deaths annually to be classified as a civil war, distinguishing it from lesser insurrections or violent disturbances.

International Involvement

While international armed conflicts (IACs) directly involve foreign nations and are subject to comprehensive IHL regulations, civil wars are primarily internal. However, they may become internationalized through indirect foreign involvement, such as proxy support, which complicates their classification. Despite such involvement, these conflicts are generally categorized as non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) unless they escalate into full-fledged wars between states.

Destructiveness and Societal Impact

Civil wars are particularly devastating, often fragmenting societies, perpetuating severe civilian abuses, and exploiting detailed local knowledge to prolong the conflict. They typically result in disproportionate civilian suffering compared to combatant casualties. On the other hand, interstate conflicts might be shorter due to the use of advanced weaponry but can still cause significant destruction and loss of life.

Similarities

Both types of conflicts involve organized violence by armed groups and are regulated under IHL, which aims to protect non-combatants, though protections vary significantly between NIACs and IACs. These conflicts can escalate rapidly, employ similar military tactics such as guerrilla warfare and strategic bombings, and often result in extensive humanitarian crises, including mass displacement and famine. Despite their distinct legal definitions, the terms “armed conflict” and “civil war” are frequently used interchangeably in media reports, underscoring the importance of precise terminology for legal and humanitarian accountability, such as in the prosecution of war crimes.

International Armed Conflict (IAC): An example of this is the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, which involves direct military confrontation between two sovereign states.

Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC): This category includes conflicts like the pre-2021 Taliban insurgency against the Afghan government, characterized by lower intensity fighting that does not escalate to the level of a full civil war.

Civil War: The Syrian Civil War, ongoing since 2011, features the national government in conflict with various insurgent groups. This prolonged conflict has resulted in over 500,000 fatalities and has drawn significant international attention and intervention.

Hybrid/Internationalized Civil War: The Yemeni Civil War, which began in 2014, is a prime example of a civil conflict that has become internationalized. It involves internal factions that are significantly supported by foreign nations such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.

General Definitions

Armed Conflict: This term is used in international humanitarian law (IHL) to describe any extended period of armed violence between organized entities. These entities can be nation-states, as seen in International Armed Conflicts (IACs), or can occur within a state, involving government forces and organized non-state actors, or between non-state groups themselves, known as Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIACs). Such conflicts must reach a certain threshold of intensity and organizational structure, though they do not necessarily result in high casualties. IHL, including provisions like Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, is applicable in these scenarios to govern the behavior of parties involved.

Civil War: A specific type of NIAC, civil war is characterized by intense, prolonged conflict within a single nation. It involves clashes between governmental forces and one or more organized non-state groups, or between such groups themselves, with the goals of seizing power, achieving independence, or instigating substantial political change. Academic circles often apply additional criteria, such as a minimum number of battle-related deaths, to differentiate civil wars from less severe insurgencies.

Key Differences

Armed Conflict: This can be either international, like the conflict between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, or non-international, such as a government battling insurgents. It covers a broad spectrum of violence, from minor skirmishes and insurgencies to full-scale interstate wars.

Civil War: Exclusively non-international, occurring within the confines of a single country. It often leads to significant societal disruption and involves competing claims over governance and territory.

Intensity and Casualty Thresholds:

Armed Conflict: Demands a certain level of intensity, such as sustained fighting that escalates beyond mere riots, and a degree of organization, like a command structure among non-state groups. However, it does not require a specific number of casualties for IHL to apply.

Civil War: Academically, a higher threshold is often required. For example, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines a civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. The Correlates of War (COW) project at the University of Chicago initially set the same threshold but has considered lowering it to 100 deaths to include smaller yet significant conflicts.

Organization and Objectives:

Armed Conflict: Non-state groups involved need only a minimal level of organization, such as identifiable leadership, and their objectives can range from political reform to gaining localized control.

Civil War: Typically features highly organized groups with explicit political or territorial ambitions, such as overthrowing the government, as seen in the Syrian Civil War, or seeking secession, like in South Sudan. These groups often control territory and may operate as quasi-states.

International Involvement:

Armed Conflict: International Armed Conflicts inherently involve multiple states. Non-International Armed Conflicts, including civil wars, may become internationalized through foreign intervention but are still classified as NIACs unless direct state-to-state combat occurs.

Civil War: Often draws foreign involvement, such as proxy support in Yemen’s Civil War, yet the primary conflict remains internal. Even when internationalized, these conflicts are treated as NIACs under IHL.

Societal Impact:

Armed Conflict: The impact varies greatly. Interstate conflicts might cause extensive destruction but less societal fragmentation. NIACs can disrupt communities but may be geographically limited.

Civil War: Typically results in deep societal divisions, widespread displacement, and elevated civilian casualties due to internal strife and extended durations of conflict. Civil wars are more likely to lead to severe atrocities, including ethnic cleansing.

University of Chicago and the Revised 100-Death Threshold in Conflict Studies

The Correlates of War (COW) project, hosted by the University of Chicago, stands as a pivotal academic resource in the realm of conflict studies. Traditionally, this project has characterized civil wars as internal conflicts that meet specific criteria:

A minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths annually.
Active involvement of both the government and organized non-state actors.
Effective resistance from both parties, avoiding scenarios of one-sided massacres.

Recent scholarly discussions and some updated studies within the project have proposed reducing this threshold to 100 deaths annually. This change aims to encompass smaller-scale conflicts that, despite their lower casualty rates, still exert considerable political or social influence. The rationale behind this adjustment includes:

Broadening Inclusion: This lower threshold aims to include conflicts that fail to meet the 1,000-death criterion yet still significantly disrupt governance or involve organized violence, such as the initial stages of insurgencies.
Academic Debate: Some researchers argue that the traditional threshold might overlook critical conflicts, particularly in smaller nations where 100 deaths can have a substantial impact. For instance, conflicts in smaller countries like East Timor might not reach the 1,000-death mark but could still destabilize the state significantly.
Enhanced Data Sensitivity: By lowering the threshold to 100 deaths, researchers can more effectively study emerging conflicts or those with fluctuating intensities, which can enhance early warning systems for potential escalations.

It’s important to note that this shift towards a 100-death threshold is not universally accepted. Many datasets, including the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), still adhere to the 1,000-death benchmark for defining “major armed conflicts” or civil wars, with conflicts resulting in 25–999 deaths categorized as “minor conflicts.” The exploration of a 100-death threshold by COW is more experimental and tends to be applied in specific sub-analyses rather than as a replacement for the established definition.

Examples of Conflicts Under Different Thresholds

Interstate Armed Conflict: The Russia-Ukraine War (2022–present) is an example of an interstate conflict with thousands of deaths, governed by comprehensive international humanitarian laws, including the Geneva Conventions.
Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), Below Civil War Threshold: The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (2009–present) had early phases with fewer than 1,000 deaths annually, qualifying as a NIAC but not as a civil war under COW’s original standard. A 100-death threshold might reclassify these earlier stages as a civil war.
Civil War (by 1,000-death threshold): The Syrian Civil War (2011–present) involves the government and various rebel groups, with over 500,000 total deaths, clearly qualifying as a civil war under both COW and UCDP standards.
Civil War (by 100-death threshold): The Northern Ireland Conflict (The Troubles, 1968–1998) saw total deaths averaging below 1,000 per year but often exceeded 100 annually, potentially qualifying as a civil war under the adjusted COW threshold, though typically classified as a low-intensity NIAC.

Global Trends and Casualty Impact

Since World War II, over 90% of armed conflicts have been non-international (NIACs), including civil wars. In 2022, UCDP recorded 55 active armed conflicts, with 8 classified as civil wars (involving 1,000+ deaths). Civil wars are noted for their higher civilian-to-combatant death ratios, as seen in the Rwandan Civil War (1990–1994) and subsequent genocide, which resulted in approximately 800,000 deaths, predominantly civilians. The COW dataset, updated until 2020, lists 296 civil wars since 1816 using the 1,000-death threshold. Lowering this threshold to 100 deaths could significantly increase the number of conflicts recognized, capturing events like the early stages of the 2011 Yemeni uprising.

Comprehensive Overview of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), hosted by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden, stands as a premier global repository for data on organized violence and armed conflicts. Established nearly half a century ago, UCDP is recognized as the oldest continuous data collection initiative focusing on civil wars and associated forms of violence. The program’s extensive data collection, coding, and dissemination efforts are pivotal resources for researchers, policymakers, journalists, and international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank. UCDP’s rigorous methodologies and comprehensive datasets are widely regarded as the gold standard for conflict research, significantly influencing global reports on human security, development, and emerging trends.

Historical Development of UCDP

Initiated in the 1970s, UCDP began by documenting ongoing violent conflicts, with a primary focus initially on armed conflicts starting from 1989. In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the program expanded its historical coverage to include conflicts dating back to 1946, resulting in the creation of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Founded by Professor Peter Wallensteen, who led the program until 2015, UCDP has broadened its scope to encompass non-state conflicts and one-sided violence. Currently under the leadership of Associate Professor Magnus Öberg, the program employs a dedicated team of 10–15 researchers and assistants. UCDP not only publishes annual updates in the Journal of Peace Research but also provides monthly preliminary data releases for Africa and global candidate datasets. The program maintains key partnerships with PRIO, the Violence Early-Warning System (ViEWS), Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), and the Global Registry of Violent Deaths (GReVD).

UCDP’s Definitions of Conflict and Types of Violence

UCDP defines organized violence as the deployment of armed force by an organized entity against another organized group or

civilians, which results in at least one direct fatality at a specific location and time. The program categorizes violence into three primary types:

State-Based Armed Conflict: Involves combat between two organized entities, at least one of which is a state government, over a contested issue related to governance or territory. An active conflict is marked by at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, with conflicts resulting in over 1,000 deaths classified as “wars.”
Non-State Conflict: Entails violence between organized non-state groups, such as rebel factions, gangs, or cartels, with at least 25 battle-related deaths annually.
One-Sided Violence: Consists of deliberate attacks by an organized group (state or non-state) against unarmed civilians, resulting in at least 25 deaths per year.

Data sources for UCDP include news reports, academic studies, and firsthand accounts, with a strong emphasis on systematic coding to ensure comparability across different cases, regions, and time periods.

Available Datasets from UCDP

UCDP offers a variety of free datasets, which are updated annually. Notable datasets include:

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (1946–2024): Provides conflict-year data on state-based armed conflicts, detailing the location, intensity, and involved parties.
UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED, 1989–2024): Offers disaggregated event-level data on individual incidents of violence, pinpointed to the village level with specific timestamps.
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (1989–2023): Contains dyad-year data on fatalities in state-based conflicts.
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (1989–2024): Includes data on conflicts between non-state actors.
UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (1989–2024): Records instances of attacks on civilians.
UCDP Candidate Events Dataset: Features monthly preliminary releases of global event data, with a one-month lag.

All datasets are accessible for download at https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/, complete with codebooks and citations for reference.

Latest Statistics and Insights (as of 2025)

The most recent annual update from UCDP, covering organized violence through 2024, reveals significant findings:

State-Based Conflicts: There were 61 active conflicts in 2024, marking the highest number recorded since 1946. Of these, 11 escalated to war status.
Total Deaths in Organized Violence: Approximately 160,000 deaths were recorded in 2024, a slight decrease from the previous year but still among the highest figures since 1989.
Deadliest Conflicts: The conflict in Ukraine resulted in 76,000 deaths; conflicts in the Middle East, including Israel-Gaza and Lebanon, accounted for 26,000 deaths, with 94% being civilians or of unknown status.
One-Sided Violence: Civilian targeting resulted in 13,900 deaths in 2024, a 31% increase from 2023, with IS (Daesh) being the deadliest perpetrator.
Non-State Conflicts: There were 75 conflicts in 2023, resulting in 20,900 deaths, indicating a slight decline but still marking the last decade as the deadliest for this category.

UCDP’s ongoing work underscores the escalating nature of global violence, highlighting the urgent need for enhanced civilian protection and the development of effective early warning systems. For further details on specific datasets, visualizations, or conflict information, additional resources are available upon request.

Understanding the Role of Hopelessness and Helplessness in Civil War Dynamics

Hopelessness and helplessness significantly heighten the risk of civil war by fostering deep-seated social, economic, and political grievances. These psychological states not only reflect underlying societal issues but also actively contribute to the escalation of conflicts. This discussion will delve into the mechanisms through which hopelessness and helplessness influence civil war likelihood, supported by data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and other academic sources.

How Hopelessness and Helplessness Fuel Conflict

Hopelessness, defined as the belief that positive change is unattainable, and helplessness, the perceived inability to influence outcomes, can severely undermine societal stability. These feelings often stem from structural problems such as poverty, inequality, political exclusion, and state repression, leading to various conflict-enhancing dynamics:

Grievance Amplification: Perceived injustices like economic deprivation and political marginalization can drive widespread discontent. This discontent can mobilize populations against the state or other groups, thereby increasing the likelihood of organized violence. For instance, the Syrian Civil War saw significant mobilization driven by despair among youth facing high unemployment and political repression, with UCDP data recording over 500,000 deaths since the conflict began in 2011.
Recruitment to Armed Groups: Rebel groups and militias often exploit feelings of hopelessness to recruit members, particularly among young men. In Nigeria, groups like Boko Haram have recruited heavily among impoverished youth in the north, where the poverty rate reached 70% in 2010, leading to a deadly conflict classified by UCDP as a non-international armed conflict with over 35,000 deaths.
Erosion of Social Cohesion: When state institutions fail to address community needs, trust erodes, and people may revert to ethnic, religious, or regional affiliations, which can escalate tensions into violence. The Rwandan Civil War and subsequent genocide, which resulted in approximately 800,000 deaths in 1994, were significantly influenced by decades of ethnic marginalization.
Economic Desperation: Economic challenges, such as high unemployment and food insecurity, are strongly correlated with increased civil war risk. For example, Yemen’s ongoing civil war has been exacerbated by economic collapse and severe hunger, contributing to a death toll that exceeds 150,000 according to UCDP data.

Academic Insights and UCDP Analysis

The UCDP framework helps contextualize how socio-economic and political factors, which often serve as proxies for hopelessness and helplessness, drive conflicts. For instance, UCDP data from 2024 shows that many conflicts involve populations suffering from severe economic hardship and political exclusion. Additionally, quantitative studies using UCDP data have found that low GDP per capita, high inequality, and political repression are significant predictors of civil war risk. The presence of a large youth population combined with high unemployment rates also increases conflict propensity, as demonstrated in regions like Gaza.

Specific Factors Linking Psychological States to Civil War

Poverty and Inequality: Historical data from the World Bank indicates that the majority of civil wars since 1945 have occurred in countries with low GDP per capita, where widespread poverty fosters feelings of hopelessness that can lead to rebellion or extremism.
Political Exclusion: Lack of political representation can lead to helplessness, prompting violent resistance. In South Sudan, ethnic exclusion has been a major factor in ongoing civil conflict, with UCDP data recording significant casualties.
Social Trauma: Prolonged exposure to violence or displacement can create a pervasive sense of hopelessness, contributing to unrest and support for militant groups, as seen in Gaza.
Trigger Events: Often, hopelessness remains latent until a specific event, such as a repressive act or economic shock, triggers widespread conflict. The Arab Spring is a prime example, where despair turned into uprisings that escalated into civil wars in countries like Libya and Syria.

Counterarguments and Considerations

While hopelessness and helplessness are critical factors, they alone are not sufficient to cause civil war. Effective organization, resources, and leadership are also necessary. Additionally, external factors like foreign intervention or competition for resources can play a decisive role in conflict dynamics. The challenge of quantifying psychological states means that studies often rely on indirect measures such as poverty rates and unemployment, which may not fully capture the depth of despair and disempowerment felt by populations on the brink of conflict.

Exploring the Impact of Economic Inequality on Civil War Risk

Economic inequality, characterized by the uneven distribution of income, wealth, or opportunities, significantly influences the likelihood of civil war. This relationship is particularly pronounced when economic disparities lead to widespread feelings of hopelessness and helplessness among disadvantaged groups. This analysis will delve into the mechanisms through which economic inequality contributes to civil war risk, utilizing academic frameworks such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and other scholarly research. Additionally, specific examples and data will be provided to illustrate these points, alongside a discussion on the broader societal impacts of economic inequality to fully contextualize its role in fostering conflict.

Key Mechanisms Linking Economic Inequality to Civil War

Economic inequality can set the stage for civil war through several interconnected mechanisms:

Grievance and Social Discontent: High levels of inequality, particularly when aligned with ethnic, regional, or class divisions, can generate deep-seated resentment and perceptions of injustice. This sense of deprivation regarding economic opportunities or resources can motivate populations to support or engage in insurgencies against perceived oppressors or the state itself. For example, in South Sudan, disparities between ethnic groups like the Dinka and Nuer, especially in access to oil revenues, have significantly fueled ongoing conflict, with UCDP reporting approximately 400,000 deaths by 2020. A 2016 study utilizing UCDP data highlighted that nations with a Gini coefficient above 0.4 are 30% more likely to experience civil war.
Hopelessness and Helplessness: Marginalized groups often experience hopelessness (a belief that improvement is unattainable) and helplessness (a perceived inability to change one’s circumstances) due to economic inequality. These feelings can drive individuals, particularly youth, towards radicalization or joining armed groups that promise change. In Nigeria, the stark economic divide between the impoverished north and the wealthier south has contributed to the rise of Boko Haram, with over 35,000 deaths recorded by UCDP since 2009. Studies from the World Bank indicate that countries with youth unemployment rates above 25% are 40% more likely to face internal conflict.
Resource Competition: Disparities in access to essential resources like land, water, or minerals can heighten tensions and lead to violence, particularly when wealth is monopolized by elites or specific groups. The Darfur Conflict in Sudan, triggered by unequal resource distribution and government favoritism, has resulted in over 300,000 deaths by 2020, according to UCDP estimates.
Weakened State Legitimacy: Perceptions of economic inequality as a result of corrupt or exclusionary governance can erode trust in state institutions. This erosion can empower rebel groups or spark uprisings, as populations feel the state is failing to meet their needs. The Syrian Civil War, for instance, was precipitated by significant economic disparities and cronyism under the Assad regime, with UCDP documenting over 500,000 deaths by 2024.
Polarization and Social Fragmentation: Economic inequality often correlates with ethnic, religious, or regional divides, exacerbating social cleavages. This polarization can escalate into civil war when competing groups vie for power or resources. In Yemen, economic disparities between the north and south, coupled with political exclusion, have been central to the ongoing civil conflict, with over 150,000 deaths noted by UCDP by 2023.

Broader Societal Impacts of Economic Inequality

Beyond its direct impact on civil war risk, economic inequality affects societies in numerous detrimental ways. It undermines economic stability and growth, exacerbates health disparities, and limits educational opportunities, contributing to a cycle of poverty and social exclusion. These broader effects not only deepen the direct impacts of inequality on civil war risk but also contribute to a more fragmented and unstable global landscape.

Understanding the multifaceted role of economic inequality in fostering civil conflict is crucial for developing effective strategies to mitigate these risks and promote more equitable and peaceful societies.

Factor	Description	How It Contributes to Civil War	Examples and Data
Economic Inequality	Unequal distribution of wealth, income, or resources (e.g., Gini coefficient > 0.4).	Fuels grievances, resentment, and competition for resources, motivating rebellion.	Syria (2011–present): Gini ~0.36 pre-war; economic disparities drove protests. UCDP: 500,000+ deaths.
Hopelessness	Belief that positive change is impossible due to poverty, exclusion, or trauma.	Pushes individuals, especially youth, toward radical groups promising change.	Nigeria (Boko Haram, 2009–present): 70% poverty in north fueled recruitment. UCDP: 35,000+ deaths.
Helplessness	Feeling powerless to influence outcomes, often due to repression or marginalization.	Erodes trust in institutions, encouraging violent resistance or support for rebels.	South Sudan (2013–present): Ethnic exclusion fostered despair. UCDP: ~400,000 deaths.
Political Exclusion	Denial of political voice or representation to certain groups (e.g., ethnic, religious).	Sparks demands for autonomy or regime change, escalating into armed conflict.	Yemen (2014–present): Houthi exclusion from power fueled rebellion. UCDP: 150,000+ deaths.
Ethnic/Religious Divisions	Polarization along ethnic or religious lines, often tied to resource or power disparities.	Deepens social cleavages, leading to group-based mobilization and violence.	Rwanda (1990–1994): Tutsi-Hutu inequality fueled civil war and genocide. UCDP: ~800,000 deaths.
Weak Governance	Corrupt, ineffective, or authoritarian state institutions unable to address grievances.	Undermines legitimacy, enabling rebel groups to gain support.	Sudan (Darfur, 2003–present): Government favoritism sparked rebellion. UCDP: 300,000+ deaths.
Resource Scarcity/Competition	Limited access to land, water, or wealth (e.g., oil, minerals) among groups.	Triggers conflicts over control, especially when inequality exacerbates scarcity.	Democratic Republic of Congo (1998–present): Mineral wealth disputes. UCDP: millions displaced.
Youth Bulge	Large proportion of young population with limited economic opportunities.	Increases pool of potential recruits for armed groups due to frustration.	Gaza (Hamas, 2007–present): 44% aged 0–14, 40% unemployment pre-2023. UCDP: 60,000+ deaths.
External Intervention	Foreign support for rebels or governments (e.g., arms, funding, proxies).	Escalates conflicts by providing resources and prolonging fighting.	Syria: Russian/Iranian support for Assad vs. Western backing of rebels. UCDP: 30% of 2024 conflicts internationalized.
Historical Grievances	Past injustices or conflicts that perpetuate mistrust and hostility.	Fuels cycles of revenge and mobilization for violence.	Bosnia (1992–1995): Historical ethnic tensions reignited war. UCDP: ~100,000 deaths.

Throughout history, civil wars have often stemmed from internal conflicts driven by political and economic inequalities, as well as struggles for freedom. Regardless of their causes or outcomes, civil wars invariably lead to devastation, destruction, and loss of life within the affected nations. The repercussions of such conflicts often extend beyond national borders, causing regional instability, uncontrolled immigration, and the deterioration of infrastructure and moral values among citizens.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran serves as a poignant example of an unexpected and unique outcome of civil strife, comparable in its profound impact only to the atrocities committed under Hitler in Germany. The ideology of political Islam, as it has evolved, stands as one of the most misrepresented political ideologies in recent history. This is particularly stark when contrasted with the ideologies of communism, which, despite its flaws, at least offered the promise of reward through hard work. In contrast, the Islamic doctrine often emphasizes sacrifice, austerity, and martyrdom, with the promise of a luxurious afterlife—a promise supported solely by prophetic words and religious faith, without tangible evidence.

In Iran, this has fostered a civil structure characterized by constant agony and self-inflicted pain, where enjoyment is often forsaken in the pursuit of spiritual closeness to God and the afterlife. This archaic and medieval philosophy starkly contradicts modern understandings of life’s origins and the questioning of the legitimacy of an afterlife and religion itself. As a result of these rigid and likely misguided beliefs, nations like Iran suffer from pervasive despair, hopelessness, and increasing poverty. In contrast, countries that have moderated the rigidity of religious doctrines, like several Arab nations, have experienced greater openness and prosperity. This stark difference highlights the impact of ideological extremity on national well-being and development.

Nations like Iran , suffering under oppressive regimes often experience a profound mental and psychological strain due to low standards of living, a lack of vitality, and escalating poverty. These conditions can push a society to its breaking point, where even a minor incident could ignite a nationwide uprising or civil war. The indecision and repetitive mistakes of Western powers, coupled with their reluctance to intervene decisively, could exacerbate the situation, potentially leading to widespread regional chaos and even the risk of a global conflict like World War III.

This potential for turmoil stems from a failure to confront and dismantle harmful ideologies aggressively. Instead, there is often a reliance on the flawed principles of political correctness and a misinterpreted notion of religious freedom. These ideologies are exploited by extremist groups that aim to establish an international Islamic state under the rule of a mythical Imam. According to their belief, this Imam will return to purge the world, leaving only those who have suffered enough to deserve entry into heaven.

If humanity is to reach its full potential and avoid descending into chaos, it is crucial for global leaders to take decisive action against these destructive forces. This means moving beyond mere rhetoric and taking concrete steps to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies that threaten global peace and stability. The time to act is now, to safeguard future generations from the repercussions of our current inaction and to foster a world where all can thrive without the shadow of tyranny.