Essay 18

It is a well-established fact that politicians and diplomats from many nations often resort to falsehoods or misleading statements to advance their agendas, even in times of peace. However, during periods of war and conflict, these distortions are frequently amplified, evolving into tools of propaganda and, at times, outright threats. In such turbulent times, the role of free press and independent journalism in democratic societies becomes even more critical. Journalists and news outlets must leverage their freedom to investigate, fact-check, and expose misinformation, ensuring the public is accurately informed and protected from the potentially devastating consequences of fake news.

On April 3, 2026, Foreign Affairs published an article by Javad Zarif, Iran’s former Foreign Minister, which began with the assertion: “Iran did not start its war with the United States and Israel. But more than a month in, the Islamic Republic is clearly winning it.” It is deeply troubling that, in the midst of war, a respected publication would provide a platform for such blatant misinformation. Zarif, throughout his tenure, was notorious for making hundreds of misleading or false statements regarding the Islamic Republic’s actions, its involvement in Middle Eastern turmoil, and, most notably, its nuclear ambitions. His record is marked by a pattern of deception that often left American and Western audiences misinformed or blindsided.

As Iran’s Foreign Minister from 2013 to 2021, Zarif was a central figure in negotiating the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Throughout this period, he consistently denied that Iran had ever pursued nuclear weapons, repeating these claims in U.S. television interviews, on social media, at the United Nations, in Iranian state media, and at international forums. Zarif portrayed Iran’s nuclear program as entirely peaceful, frequently referencing a supposed religious prohibition (fatwa) by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and insisting that nuclear weapons were immoral, irrational, and contrary to Iran’s security interests.

Critics—including Israeli and U.S. officials—have long argued that Zarif’s statements were part of a calculated campaign of deception. They contend that Iran’s denials were designed to secure sanctions relief under the JCPOA while concealing a covert nuclear weapons program, particularly in the years before 2003. This view gained further traction after the 2018 Israeli seizure of the so-called “Atomic Archive,” which revealed extensive documentation of Iran’s past nuclear weapons research and development.

The following analysis provides a structured fact-check of Zarif’s nuclear weapons claims, drawing on primary sources such as interviews, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, the Atomic Archive, and contemporaneous reactions from international actors. It also briefly addresses related issues, such as differing interpretations of the JCPOA and Iran’s missile program, to provide a comprehensive perspective. This examination incorporates evidence from multiple viewpoints—official Iranian positions, Western and Israeli intelligence assessments, and IAEA findings—while acknowledging important nuances, such as the program’s pre-2003 focus and the escalation of nuclear activities following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Ultimately, the case of Javad Zarif exemplifies the challenges faced by the international community in discerning truth from strategic deception, especially when the stakes involve regional stability and global security. It underscores the indispensable role of vigilant journalism and transparent analysis in holding powerful actors accountable and safeguarding the public from the dangers of misinformation.

1. Core Claim: Iran Never Sought, Developed, or Wanted Nuclear Weapons (“We Will Never Have a Bomb”)

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif consistently asserted, especially in English-language U.S. media, that Iran had never pursued, developed, or desired nuclear weapons. This narrative was central to building international support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Key Examples Across Platforms

• U.S. TV Interviews: In a 2015 NBC interview with Ann Curry, Zarif declared, “Iran is not about building nuclear weapons. We don’t wanna build nuclear weapons. We don’t believe that nuclear weapons bring security to anybody… We will never have a bomb.” Similar denials appeared in a 2019 CBS interview with Margaret Brennan (“We never wanted to produce a bomb”) and in PBS/NPR appearances, where Zarif reiterated Iran’s commitment under the JCPOA preface to never develop nuclear weapons.
• Twitter and Public Rebuttals: Following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2018 presentation of alleged Iranian nuclear documents, Zarif tweeted dismissively, calling it “the boy who can’t stop crying wolf” and a “rehash of old allegations already dealt with by the IAEA.” Iranian officials labeled the documents “fake and fabricated.”
• Other Forums: In a 2014 New Yorker profile and Council on Foreign Relations events, Zarif emphasized that Iran’s nuclear program was aligned with nonproliferation and had “nothing to do with nuclear weapons.” He repeated these assurances in interviews with Al Jazeera and Press TV.

Fact-Check and Evidence

• Contradictory Evidence from the Atomic Archive (2018): In April 2018, Netanyahu revealed approximately 55,000 pages and 183 CDs of documents seized by Mossad from a secret Tehran warehouse. These files, known as the “Atomic Archive,” detailed “Project Amad”—Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program (circa 1999–2003). The archive included:
  • Designs for five nuclear warheads
  • Blueprints for implosion devices, neutron initiators, and high-explosive testing
  • Efforts to integrate warheads with missiles
  • Plans to preserve “scientific know-how” under a rebranded program after 2003

The documents revealed systematic concealment from the IAEA, including undeclared sites and activities. Netanyahu directly quoted Zarif’s denials and argued the archive proved Iran “lied.”

• IAEA Findings: A 2011 IAEA report outlined “Possible Military Dimensions” (PMD) to Iran’s program, including weaponization work until at least 2003. Iran denied the Amad Plan’s existence and provided incomplete answers. In 2015, the IAEA closed the PMD file after limited Iranian cooperation, stating “no credible indications” of explosive device work after 2009, but did not fully resolve past issues or declare the archive fabricated.
• U.S. Intelligence Context: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran halted weaponization in 2003 (“high confidence”), but later assessments and the Atomic Archive indicated knowledge preservation and possible low-level continuation. U.S. officials, including then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, argued the JCPOA was “built on lies” after the archive’s revelation.

Nuances and Implications

• Iranian Response: Zarif and Iranian officials argued the archive was old news, already known to the IAEA, and irrelevant to JCPOA compliance, which focused on current safeguards rather than historical activities. After the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran escalated uranium enrichment beyond JCPOA limits, blaming U.S. “economic terrorism.”
• Edge Cases: Defenders note there is no evidence of active bomb-building post-2009 (per IAEA), and Iran claims its right under the NPT to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Critics argue that deception enabled Iran to maintain a breakout capability. The archive does not prove post-JCPOA violations but undermines the narrative of purely peaceful intent.
• Broader Context: Iran’s nuclear program was first exposed in 2002 (Natanz and Fordow sites), leading to international sanctions. Zarif’s diplomatic outreach helped shift narratives toward negotiation, but the Atomic Archive revelations fueled skepticism about Iran’s future assurances.

2. The Khamenei “Fatwa” Against Nuclear Weapons

Zarif and other Iranian officials frequently cited a supposed religious fatwa by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as proof that nuclear weapons were forbidden under Islamic law.

• Statements: Zarif referenced the fatwa in U.S. interviews and negotiations, presenting it as a binding Islamic ban on the production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear weapons. Western officials, including President Obama, echoed this claim during JCPOA talks.
• Fact-Check: No publicly verifiable written fatwa exists in official records. References are oral or indirect, dating to the mid-1990s or 2003. Hassan Rouhani, then Iran’s nuclear negotiator, later admitted that the fatwa concept was introduced in 2004 talks as a tactical move to build credibility, without prior coordination with Khamenei.
• Shia Jurisprudence: Fatwas are not permanent and can change based on “expediency” (maslahat-e nezam), prioritizing regime survival. Khamenei has alluded to flexibility in private or contextual statements. Critics describe the fatwa as a rhetorical or diplomatic tool rather than an immutable religious edict.
• Implications: The fatwa was effective diplomatically but lacks the legal or religious weight Iran claimed, contributing to perceptions of ambiguity and negotiable intent.

3. Other Issues: JCPOA Interpretations, Missiles, and Broader Denials

• JCPOA Factsheet Disputes (2015): Zarif publicly claimed that the U.S. summary of the JCPOA contradicted the actual framework, particularly on issues like sanctions snapback and enrichment rights. PolitiFact and other outlets noted real interpretive gaps between the sides, though the deal was ultimately signed.
• Ballistic Missiles: Zarif described Iran’s missile program as purely defensive in interviews (e.g., Al Jazeera), denying any intent to develop nuclear delivery systems. However, the Atomic Archive included missile-warhead integration designs, and Iran has tested missiles capable of reaching regional targets. While no major independent fact-check labels Zarif’s statements as outright lies, they conflict with archive evidence and U.S./Israeli concerns. Notably, missiles were excluded from the JCPOA.
• Regional and Human Rights Issues: Zarif downplayed Iran’s support for proxies (Syria, Yemen, Hezbollah), framing it as defensive or exaggerated by adversaries, and criticized Western human rights sanctions as selective. These claims are more interpretive; independent analyses (e.g., UN, think tanks) document Iranian involvement, but direct accusations of lying are less common than on nuclear issues.

Platforms Summary

Zarif’s messaging targeted Western audiences through U.S. TV (NBC, CBS, PBS, ABC’s This Week) during JCPOA negotiations (2013–2015) and the Trump era (2018–2019). Twitter was used for rapid rebuttals, while Iranian/Press TV and UN speeches reinforced domestic and international narratives.

Overall Assessment, Nuances, and Considerations

Zarif’s denials regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions are consistent with the Islamic Republic’s long-standing official narrative. However, these denials are undermined by substantial documentary evidence, including the so-called “nuclear archive,” which reveals a covert weapons program and systematic concealment from international inspectors. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) temporarily capped Iran’s nuclear activities through rigorous inspections and technical limits, but ambiguities surrounding Iran’s nuclear fatwa and the revelations from the archive eroded international trust—especially after the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, which prompted Iran to breach its commitments.

The situation is complex and multi-faceted. From Tehran’s perspective, Iran sees itself as a victim of U.S. and Israeli sabotage, maintaining that it remains compliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Critics, however, interpret Iran’s actions as calculated deception, designed to maintain strategic latency and preserve the option of weaponization. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains the technical authority, but its ability to verify compliance has been hampered by restricted access and incomplete disclosures.

Several nuanced distinctions are important:

• Pre-2003 vs. Post-2009: Intelligence assessments suggest Iran halted active weaponization work before 2003 but retained the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to resume such activities if desired.
• JCPOA Sunset Clauses: The agreement’s time-limited restrictions raised concerns about Iran’s potential for a rapid “breakout” once key provisions expired, despite Zarif’s public assurances of an indefinite non-weapons commitment.
• Recent Developments: Since Zarif’s tenure, Iran has significantly increased uranium enrichment, approaching weapons-grade levels amid escalating tensions with Israel and the West.

There is no direct evidence that Zarif personally fabricated documents. However, as Foreign Minister and the regime’s chief spokesperson, his public statements often reflected official positions that, in light of the nuclear archive, amounted to deliberate misrepresentation.

This assessment is based on verifiable public records as of 2026. For the most current IAEA findings or specific interview transcripts, primary sources such as IAEA.gov and archived media interviews should be consulted.

Omissions and Broader Context

Zarif’s public narrative omits critical aspects of the Islamic Republic’s history and conduct. Notably, he fails to acknowledge that Iran declared hostility toward the United States in 1979 by seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, holding 52 Americans hostage for over 400 days, and orchestrating attacks such as the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which killed more than 250 American servicemen. Iran’s involvement in numerous other terrorist attacks, both inside the United States and abroad, is well-documented.

Furthermore, Zarif does not address the Islamic Republic’s extensive record of human rights abuses, including the violent suppression of peaceful protests—resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Iranians—and the widespread use of public executions, second only to China in scale. Under Zarif’s tenure, Iran’s proxies have been implicated in assassinations and mass violence across the Middle East and beyond.

Despite these omissions, Zarif used his platform in Foreign Affairs to criticize the United States and President Trump, while sidestepping Iran’s own record of repression and violence. While freedom of expression allows for the airing of diverse viewpoints, the uncritical publication of demonstrably false or misleading claims—without rigorous fact-checking—undermines the credibility of democratic discourse and responsible journalism.