Essay 17

In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini and Sahil V. Shah present an analysis of the ongoing crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, focusing on the aftermath of the recent U.S.-Iran military confrontation and the fragile cease-fire that followed. Their article, “Tehran Needs Positive Incentives, Not Just Pressure,” argues that the current diplomatic window is narrow but crucial for achieving lasting de-escalation. They contend that while President Trump’s emphasis on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions is understandable, relying solely on coercion or military threats is both insufficient and potentially dangerous.

Mogherini and Shah advocate for diplomacy as the only viable path to ensuring Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful. They reference the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a successful, albeit temporary, multilateral agreement that imposed verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear activities through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. However, their discussion of the JCPOA is brief and omits its well-documented shortcomings, such as the sunset clauses on centrifuge restrictions and uranium enrichment levels, which critics argue left loopholes for future proliferation.

The authors’ central thesis is that war or a strategy of “maximum pressure” alone would only strengthen Iran’s hard-liner factions—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Supreme Leader-aligned elements—while increasing the risk of regional escalation through Iran’s network of proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. They propose that positive incentives, such as targeted sanctions relief, economic normalization, and sustained diplomatic engagement, are essential complements to pressure if the goal is to achieve verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and to moderate its regional behavior.

Mogherini, who served as the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2014 to 2019, writes from a center-left, multilateralist perspective. However, the article does not clarify whether her statements reflect her current official capacity or are personal opinions, especially when she asserts that any American war against Iran would be “illegal.” This lack of clarity raises questions about the legal and diplomatic weight of her assertions.

Notably, the article largely sidesteps critical issues such as Iran’s longstanding human rights abuses, the regime’s ideological hostility toward the West and Israel, and its support for proxy terrorism. These omissions are significant, given the extensive documentation by the United Nations and human rights organizations of the Islamic Republic’s repression of its own citizens, particularly women, and its destabilizing activities across the Middle East. Mogherini’s failure to address these topics is especially striking given her own privileged position as a European diplomat who enjoys—and allegedly violates—the very rights denied to millions of Iranians.

Furthermore, the article does not address why a “peaceful” nuclear program would require secretive underground facilities or why a regime claiming peaceful intentions would invest so heavily in regional militias and support for authoritarian allies, such as the Assad regime in Syria. Nor does it acknowledge that Iran’s hard-liners are already entrenched in power, or that regional instability has persisted for decades, independent of U.S. policy.

Mogherini’s credibility is further complicated by recent allegations of corruption and fraud in Europe, unrelated to her Iran portfolio but nonetheless raising questions about her political and financial integrity. Her reportedly close relationship with Javad Zarif, Iran’s former foreign minister, and her repeated visits to Iran—where she adhered to the regime’s dress code while ignoring the plight of Iranian women protesting compulsory hijab laws—have also drawn criticism. While rumors of her receiving expensive gifts from Iranian officials remain unsubstantiated, such perceptions contribute to concerns about bias and diplomatic propriety.

In summary, while Mogherini and Shah’s article offers a pragmatic case for diplomacy and positive incentives as tools for managing the Iran crisis, it is weakened by its selective focus and lack of engagement with the broader context of the Islamic Republic’s domestic repression, ideological extremism, and regional aggression. By treating these issues as peripheral, the authors risk underestimating the complexity of the challenge and the limitations of purely diplomatic solutions.

In summary, while Mogherini and Shah’s article presents a pragmatic argument for diplomacy and positive incentives as tools for managing the Iran crisis, its effectiveness is undermined by a selective focus and insufficient engagement with the broader realities of the Islamic Republic’s domestic repression, ideological extremism, and regional aggression. The regime has a well-documented history of leveraging financial incentives, business deals, and personal favors to cultivate sympathetic voices abroad, including among business lobbies, journalists, and politicians from various countries.

For Iranians enduring daily economic hardship, gender apartheid, and executions, the image of a European woman in power covering her hair—while allegedly enjoying privileges—can feel like a profound betrayal, especially when contrasted with the plight of Iranian women imprisoned or killed for refusing the hijab. While Western officials visiting Iran are required to follow local laws, including the hijab mandate for women, and refusal could jeopardize diplomatic talks, the symbolism remains powerful: it risks normalizing a system that systematically denies basic rights to women.

Mogherini’s socialist and EU background, which emphasizes “engagement” as a core value, can sometimes blur the line between constructive diplomacy and excessive accommodation. The contrast between the comfortable lifestyles of European officials and the suffering of ordinary Iranians only deepens public resentment. By treating these critical issues as peripheral, the authors risk underestimating both the complexity of the challenge and the limitations of relying solely on diplomatic solutions.