Essay 07

“In a situation where the Islamic Republic has once again resorted to an iron fist, seeking to silence dissent at its roots, the country’s universities have become bastions of resistance and protest. Students, with awareness and courage, stand at the forefront of the struggle for freedom and justice. The task of revolutionary left forces is to connect hope for the future with organization, class consciousness, and practical solidarity, and to offer unwavering support to the student movement. The Council of Cooperation of Left and Communist Forces strongly condemns any attack on the lives and security of students and emphasizes the following fundamental principles: unconditional defense of the right to assembly and protest, support for independent student organizations, and safeguarding freedom of expression and thought in universities. We declare that defending the university is defending society and its future. Signatories: Socialist Workers’ Unity, Communist Party of Iran, Workers’ Communist Party of Iran – Hekmatist, Rah-e Kargar Organization, Fedayian Organization (Minority), and Minority Nucleus.”

Expanded Historical Role of Iranian Leftists and Communists in the 1979 Revolution

In the years preceding the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the opposition to the Shah was a diverse and dynamic coalition. This alliance encompassed secular nationalists inspired by Mohammad Mossadegh’s National Front, liberal intellectuals, religious reformists, and a spectrum of leftist and Marxist organizations. Among the most prominent leftist groups were the Tudeh Party (Iran’s principal pro-Soviet communist party), the Organization of Iranian People’s Fedai Guerrillas (Fedaian, a Marxist-Leninist armed group), and the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), which uniquely fused Islamic and Marxist ideologies. These groups were instrumental in orchestrating mass protests, labor strikes—most notably among oil workers—and, in some cases, armed resistance against the Shah’s security apparatus. Their vision for the revolution was rooted in anti-imperialist and socialist aspirations, viewing the overthrow of the monarchy as a gateway to a more just, egalitarian society. Many leftists regarded Ayatollah Khomeini as a tactical ally, believing his opposition to Western imperialism and the monarchy could be harnessed to further their own revolutionary objectives, even as they remained wary of his clerical ambitions.

Support for Khomeini and the Ascendancy of the Clergy

During the revolutionary fervor, leftist groups played a pivotal role in amplifying Khomeini’s leadership. The Tudeh Party, for example, publicly endorsed Khomeini as an “anti-imperialist” champion, disseminating propaganda that depicted the Islamic movement as compatible with socialist revolution. Through pamphlets, books, articles, and impassioned speeches, leftist intellectuals and activists mobilized the masses, coordinated strikes that paralyzed the economy, and fostered a sense of unity against the Shah. Influenced by global currents of Third World liberation and anti-colonial thought, some leftist thinkers and writers—echoing figures like Michel Foucault—romanticized the revolutionary potential of political Islam, interpreting it as a spiritual and cultural awakening against Western domination. However, this alliance was fraught with contradictions. Critics, both contemporary and retrospective, argue that the left’s willingness to overlook Khomeini’s explicit theocratic agenda—articulated in his doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist)—amounted to a grave miscalculation. In their zeal to topple the Shah, many leftists subordinated secular and democratic principles to the imperatives of anti-imperialism and revolutionary unity, inadvertently empowering the clerical establishment. As some analysts have observed, the left “underestimated the organizational strength and popular appeal of the Islamic clergy,” neglecting the long-term consequences for democracy and pluralism in Iran.

Post-Revolution Repression and the Fate of the Left

The aftermath of the revolution brought a swift and brutal reversal of fortunes for Iran’s leftists and communists. Once the Islamic Republic consolidated power, it moved decisively to eliminate its former allies. Between 1981 and 1983, amid the chaos of the Iran-Iraq War and internal factional struggles, the regime unleashed a wave of repression against leftist organizations. The Tudeh Party was outlawed in 1983; its leaders were arrested, tortured, and coerced into televised confessions denouncing Marxism as “anti-Islamic.” Thousands of members of the Tudeh, Fedaian, and other leftist groups were executed or imprisoned. The most notorious episode occurred in 1988, when an estimated 4,000–5,000 political prisoners—predominantly leftists and MEK affiliates—were summarily executed in what Amnesty International later described as a “crime against humanity.” Khomeini himself dismissed the contributions of the left, declaring that they “did not help the revolution at all” and “only caused us problems.” This systematic purge decimated the Iranian left, forcing survivors into exile or clandestinity. In hindsight, many Iranian dissidents and Western observers have characterized the left’s role as that of “useful idiots”—allies who were instrumental in the revolution’s success but were ruthlessly discarded once their utility to the new regime had expired.

Legacy and Contemporary Reflections

The tragic trajectory of Iran’s leftist and communist movements in the 1979 revolution remains a subject of intense debate and reflection. Their initial optimism and activism contributed significantly to the downfall of the Shah, yet their strategic misjudgments and underestimation of the clerical establishment’s ambitions led to their own marginalization and destruction. The experience serves as a cautionary tale about the perils of revolutionary alliances and the complexities of navigating ideological coalitions in times of upheaval. Today, the legacy of the Iranian left is marked by both its courageous resistance and its ultimate betrayal, offering enduring lessons for movements seeking social justice and political transformation in similarly volatile contexts.

Relevance to the 2025–2026 Uprisings

Amid the ongoing mass protests the Islamic Republic—driven by economic collapse, endemic corruption, and state violence—surviving leftist and communist organizations (such as the remnants of the Worker-Communist Party, Communist Party of Iran, and the Council of Cooperation of Left and Communist Forces) have largely aligned themselves with the popular uprisings. Their public statements consistently denounce regime repression and call for worker solidarity, class consciousness, and fundamental rights such as free assembly and independent labor organizing. These groups emphasize the necessity of grassroots, working-class movement to challenge both theocratic rule and capitalist exploitation.

However, their position remains controversial within the broader opposition. Critics—including monarchists, secular democrats, and some diaspora activists—accuse leftist factions of undermining unity by labeling figures like Reza Pahlavi as “monarchists backed by U.S. imperialism.” Such rhetoric, detractors argue, risks fracturing the anti-regime coalition and inadvertently prolonging the regime’s survival. These dynamic echoes the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, when leftist anti-imperialist discourse was seen by some as diluting the focus on toppling the clerical establishment, ultimately enabling Islamists to consolidate power. While there is no credible evidence that these leftist groups are collaborating with the regime—in fact, they continue to face arrests, harassment, and executions—their ideological critiques of alternative opposition leaders are viewed by some as divisive, repeating historical mistakes and complicating efforts to build a broad-based movement for change.

Foucault’s Engagement with the Iranian Revolution

Michel Foucault, the influential French philosopher renowned for his analyses of power, knowledge, and modernity, developed a deep and controversial fascination with the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979. During this period, Foucault traveled to Iran twice in 1978 as a special correspondent for the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera. He conducted interviews with a range of political and religious figures, observed mass demonstrations, and met with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in exile near Paris. Foucault’s engagement produced approximately thirteen essays, articles, and interviews—most published in French and Italian outlets between 1978 and 1979, with some remaining untranslated for years. These writings reveal Foucault’s striking enthusiasm for the revolution, which he interpreted as a radical alternative to both Western liberalism and Soviet-style socialism.

Foucault’s Positive Appraisal of the Revolution

Foucault did not view the Iranian uprising as a conventional Marxist or liberal revolution focused on economic redistribution or democratic reform. Instead, he characterized it as a profound experiment in “political spirituality”—a collective rejection of the materialistic, bureaucratic modernity imposed by the West and mirrored in Soviet socialism. In his influential article “What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?” (October 1978), Foucault described the movement as a mass pursuit of a “luminous and distant point,” where fidelity to Islamic ideals could supplant obedience to secular law. He praised the mobilizing power of Shia Islam, seeing it as a creative force capable of uniting millions in resistance to global capitalism and imperialism.

Foucault highlighted the revolution’s ambiguity and singularity, predicting that it would not culminate in a conventional nation-state but rather in an “Islamic government” rooted in ethical self-transformation and the valorization of martyrdom—drawing analogies to early Christian practices. He was particularly captivated by Khomeini, whom he depicted as a mythic, ascetic leader embodying anti-modern resistance without a rigid political program. For Foucault, this lack of specificity was a virtue, enabling a “polymorphous” opposition that transcended traditional left-right divisions. In essays such as “The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt” (November 1978), he portrayed Khomeini as a symbol of unwavering resolve against the Shah’s Western-backed autocracy.

Foucault’s fascination with the Iranian Revolution was also deeply connected to his broader philosophical project. He saw the revolution as a living example of his theories on power: not as something centralized and hierarchical, but as something dispersed, embodied, and resisted through everyday practices—both bodily and spiritual. Foucault suggested that the Iranian experience could inspire a global rethinking of politics, offering an “antiteleological” path that rejected linear, progressive historical narratives in favor of radical, unpredictable transformation.

Criticisms and the Aftermath of the Iranian Revolution

Michel Foucault’s engagement with the Iranian Revolution was met with immediate and enduring criticism. Many contemporaries, including Iranian feminists and Western intellectuals such as Maxime Rodinson and Claudia Wright, accused Foucault of romanticizing a movement that rapidly transformed into an authoritarian theocracy. These critics argued that Foucault’s enthusiasm blinded him to the revolution’s darker potential, particularly its capacity for repression and violence. He was notably dismissive of warnings regarding the possible oppression of women, homosexuals, and religious or ethnic minorities. In his 1979 exchange with an Iranian woman, “Is It Useless to Revolt?”, Foucault argued that such concerns were rooted in Western prejudices and failed to appreciate the revolution’s transformative promise. He minimized reports of forced veiling, executions, and other abuses, suggesting these were not intrinsic to the Islamist movement but rather temporary excesses that would be corrected over time.

The aftermath of the revolution, however, seemed to vindicate many of Foucault’s critics. Under Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic imposed strict Sharia law, executed thousands—including leftists, dissidents, and homosexuals—and severely curtailed women’s rights. These outcomes, which Foucault had not foreseen or sufficiently addressed, exposed the limitations of his analysis. Scholars such as Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, in their influential book Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (2005), argue that Foucault’s writings on Iran reveal deeper flaws in his thought: a skepticism toward Enlightenment rationality, a fascination with liminal experiences like death and martyrdom, and a problematic relationship with feminism and gender politics. They contend that Foucault’s attraction to the revolution was shaped by his evolving ideas about sexuality and the self, and that he was “seduced” by the anti-modern, anti-Western stance of radical Islamism—a seduction influenced by his engagement with thinkers like Martin Heidegger.

Other scholars, such as Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi in Foucault in Iran (2016), offer a more sympathetic interpretation. They argue that Foucault was not endorsing the excesses of the Islamic Republic but rather highlighting the possibility of political alternatives outside the framework of Western universalism. According to this view, Foucault’s writings on Iran should be seen as an exploration of the limits of Western political thought, rather than an uncritical celebration of the revolution itself.

After 1979, Foucault largely withdrew from public commentary on Iran, as controversy over his position intensified. The experience left a mark on his later work, particularly his lectures on parrhesia (truth-telling) and his reflections on the Enlightenment. While Foucault never issued a full retraction of his earlier views, some interpret his 1984 essay “What Is Enlightenment?” as a subtle self-critique, in which he re-emphasizes the importance of critical reason and cautions against the uncritical rejection of modernity.

In my assessment, Foucault’s writings on Iran reveal both his intellectual strengths and his blind spots. He was remarkably prescient in identifying radical Islamism as a new global force capable of challenging Western dominance—a foresight that resonates in the post-9/11 era. Yet his romanticization of revolutionary rupture and spiritual renewal led him to underestimate the dangers of theocracy and to overlook urgent human rights concerns. This episode illustrates how even the most brilliant thinkers can err when theory is projected onto complex and unpredictable realities. At the same time, Foucault’s engagement with Iran continues to enrich debates about cultural relativism, anti-imperialism, and the limits of Western political thought.

Khomeini and Khamenei After 47 Years: A Critical Scorecard

Nearly half a century after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, a thorough examination of Khomeini’s writings and the Islamic Republic’s trajectory under both Khomeini and Khamenei reveals a persistent pattern of ideological rigidity, strategic miscalculation, and profound detachment from the realities of modern global politics. This assessment, grounded in extensive scholarly and historical analysis, also exposes the shortcomings of Michel Foucault’s early enthusiasm for the revolution and his misreading of Khomeini’s character and vision.

Khomeini’s Writings: Medievalism and Political Simplicity

Khomeini’s foundational texts—most notably Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government, 1970) and Tahrir al-Wasilah—articulate a worldview anchored in medieval Shi’ite jurisprudence. He advocates for the absolute authority of the cleric (the “guardian jurist”) over all aspects of governance, dismissing democratic principles, constitutionalism, and the separation of powers as Western corruptions. In Velayat-e Faqih, Khomeini explicitly rejects popular sovereignty, arguing that only a supreme religious leader can safeguard society during the occultation of the Hidden Imam. This model, critics argue, is autocratic and demands unquestioning obedience, suppressing dissent and critical thought.

His writings reveal a striking lack of engagement with the complexities of modern global politics. Khomeini idealizes sharia as a timeless, perfect system, refusing to adapt it to contemporary challenges such as economic globalization, human rights, or international diplomacy. He frames capitalism, communism, and democracy as inherently corrupt imports, advocating for isolationism and anti-imperialist rhetoric that ignores the necessity of pragmatic engagement with the world. This ideological inflexibility—what many scholars term “simple mindedness”—results in a worldview that is both anachronistic and contradictory: while borrowing populist slogans from the left, Khomeini discards the democratic elements, creating a system that secularizes Islamic law under clerical rule but labels it “Islamic.”

In foreign affairs, Khomeini’s binary vision—dividing the world into “oppressed” and “imperialists”—leaves little room for negotiation or mutual benefit. This simplistic anti-Western stance led to costly miscalculations, such as the prolonged Iran-Iraq War, which he refused to end for ideological reasons despite catastrophic losses.

Khamenei’s Legacy: Systemic Failures and Global Isolation

Since 1989, Khamenei has entrenched and extended Khomeini’s vision, with disastrous results. The Islamic Republic’s 47-year record is marked by:

• Economic Collapse and Mismanagement: Chronic sanctions, endemic corruption, and Khamenei’s so-called “resistance economy” have produced hyperinflation, widespread poverty (affecting over 60% of Iranians), capital flight, and technological stagnation. Environmental crises, such as severe water shortages, are direct consequences of governance failures and policy paralysis.
• Foreign Policy Overreach and Reversals: While Khamenei’s support for proxy groups (Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas) initially expanded Iran’s regional influence, these networks have faltered under sustained Israeli and U.S. pressure. Failures in Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq have exposed the limits of Iran’s reach. Nuclear ambitions have only deepened Iran’s isolation, prolonging sanctions and inviting military strikes that the regime cannot effectively counter.
• The regime’s survival now depends on brutal repression, not popular consent. Crackdowns on mass protests (notably in 2019 and 2022–2023-2025-2026) have resulted in thousands of deaths, fueling public outrage and warnings from officials of a looming “social explosion.” Khamenei’s refusal to adapt has left Iran a failing state, prioritizing regime survival over national prosperity.

Foucault’s Misjudgment: The Limits of Revolutionary Romanticism

Michel Foucault’s early support for the Iranian Revolution and his fascination with Khomeini’s movement now appear deeply misguided. Foucault underestimated the depth of Khomeini’s ideological rigidity and failed to grasp the consequences of subordinating politics to clerical authority. The subsequent history of the Islamic Republic—marked by economic decline, international isolation, and relentless repression—stands as a stark refutation of Foucault’s optimism and a cautionary tale about the dangers of romanticizing revolutionary movements without understanding their intellectual foundations.

A Legacy of Failure

After 47 years, the Islamic Republic’s record is one of broken promises and systemic dysfunction. Khomeini’s vision, rooted in a simplistic and inflexible reading of Islamic law, has proven incapable of meeting the demands of a modern, interconnected world. Khamenei’s leadership has only deepened these failures, leaving Iran isolated, impoverished, and repressive. The evidence is overwhelming: the ideological foundations laid by Khomeini, and celebrated by Foucault, have produced not justice and self-reliance, but poverty, repression, and a state in perpetual crisis. In my view, the Iranian experience stands as a powerful indictment of the dangers of ideological dogmatism and the necessity of engaging with the complexities of the modern world.