Essay 10

At the outset, I must state that I fundamentally disagree with John Mearsheimer’s realist interpretation of the Middle East, particularly regarding Iran. Mearsheimer, a distinguished international relations theorist and professor at the University of Chicago, is renowned for his contributions to realist theory, notably through works such as The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and his co-authored book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. He has consistently analyzed Middle Eastern conflicts through the lens of power dynamics, deterrence, and the dangers of escalation, often critiquing both U.S. and Israeli policies.

In mid-2025, amid heightened Israel-Iran tensions, Mearsheimer made several public statements and analyses concerning Iran’s missile capabilities. He specifically referenced Operation True Promise, during which Iran launched over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles at Israeli targets in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iran’s embassy in Damascus. Mearsheimer argued that Israel lacks the independent capacity to fully defend itself against such a large-scale Iranian missile barrage. He pointed out that, despite Israel’s advanced missile defense systems like the Arrow—developed with significant U.S. assistance—Israel was unable to intercept most incoming projectiles without substantial American support during that incident.

From this, Mearsheimer extrapolates a broader strategic conclusion: Israel cannot achieve a decisive victory in a direct, conventional war with Iran. He contends that any such conflict would likely devolve into a prolonged war of attrition, reminiscent of Israel’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon, which ultimately ended in withdrawal after significant losses inflicted by Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy. According to Mearsheimer, Israel’s military and society are not structured for extended, grinding conflicts like the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The economic and social costs would be unsustainable, making Israel highly vulnerable in a drawn-out confrontation. This, he argues, serves as a powerful deterrent, restraining Israel from initiating or escalating to full-scale war with Iran without overwhelming U.S. backing. In his view, this strategic reality underpins the so-called “no war” dynamic, where both sides avoid all-out conflict due to the prohibitive risks involved.

However, I believe Mearsheimer’s analysis overlooks several critical factors. Most notably, he underestimates the internal weaknesses of the Islamic regime in Iran. The regime suffers from widespread unpopularity, both in terms of its governance and the broader appeal of political Islam within Iranian society. Public discontent, economic hardship, and a lack of legitimacy have eroded the regime’s domestic standing. Furthermore, the Iranian leadership often exaggerates its military capabilities for propaganda purposes, masking significant vulnerabilities. These internal dynamics could severely limit Iran’s ability to sustain a prolonged conflict or effectively project power, undermining the deterrence argument that Mearsheimer emphasizes. In sum, while Mearsheimer’s realist framework offers valuable insights into the balance of power, it fails to account for the profound internal challenges facing the Iranian regime and the potential impact of these factors on regional stability and conflict dynamics.

I agree with the assessment that the United States plays a pivotal role in the outcome of conflicts involving Israel, as highlighted by Mearsheimer’s observation that “America might be able to finish the war.” He underscores Israel’s significant reliance on American military support, especially in high-stakes scenarios. The U.S. maintains a formidable presence in the region, with assets stationed across the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and within Israel itself. These resources enable the U.S. to intercept incoming missiles, deliver overwhelming firepower, and potentially shift the balance decisively in Israel’s favor, thereby resolving or “finishing” a conflict.

However, Mearsheimer also issues a cautionary note: such deep entanglement risks drawing the United States into a much broader war. This could inadvertently push Iran into closer alignment with Russia and China, heightening global tensions and increasing the risk of escalation. Furthermore, he warns that U.S. involvement might incentivize Iran to pursue nuclear weapons as a counter-deterrent, which could, in turn, trigger a regional arms race, with countries like Saudi Arabia or Turkey seeking their own nuclear capabilities.

Yet, Mearsheimer’s analysis overlooks a crucial point: neither Turkey, Russia, nor China are likely to support the emergence of a dominant regional power, especially given their own domestic concerns. Russia and China, both with significant and growing Muslim populations, as well as Turkey, have strategic interests in preventing any single state from achieving overwhelming influence in the Middle East. Their policies are shaped not only by regional dynamics but also by internal demographic and political considerations.

Mearsheimer’s perspective is rooted in offensive realism, which posits that states are primarily motivated by the pursuit of survival and power. In this context, Iran’s expanding missile arsenal—including advanced cruise missiles designed to evade radar—serves as a deterrent, creating a balance that discourages outright aggression. It is important to note that Mearsheimer does not advocate for Iran; rather, he views these developments as structural realities within the international system.

There are, however, academics who take a more openly pro-Iranian stance. For example, Alireza Doostdar, another professor at the University of Chicago, made comments in 2025 that appeared to support Iran’s missile capabilities. While Mearsheimer’s analysis is grounded in realist theory, others interpret the regional balance of power through different ideological or strategic lenses.

Mearsheimer’s Realism, Ideology, and the Iran-Israel Standoff

Mearsheimer’s realist framework prioritizes structural factors—such as the balance of power, deterrence, and the logic of state survival—over purely ideological motivations. However, it is crucial to recognize that ideology, alliances, and nuclear risks do not operate in isolation; rather, they intersect with and shape these structural dynamics in significant ways.

According to Mearsheimer, the current standoff between Israel and Iran is characterized by a strategic impasse. Israel lacks the capacity to decisively defeat Iran without direct U.S. intervention, while Iran leverages asymmetric tools—most notably its network of proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis—to deter Israeli attacks and complicate any military calculus. This mutual deterrence discourages all-out war, but it also creates a volatile equilibrium that could unravel if escalation spirals out of control.

The United States plays a pivotal role in this equation. Historically, America has provided Israel with intelligence, advanced munitions, and defensive support, as seen during Iran’s 2024 missile barrage. Should hostilities escalate—particularly if Iran retaliates against U.S. assets in the region, such as military bases in Iraq or the Gulf—there is a real risk of the U.S. being drawn into a protracted conflict. Recent analyses warn that such escalation could trigger a cycle of strikes and counterstrikes, broaden the conflict and entangling the U.S. in another “forever war.” Mearsheimer cautions that over-reliance on U.S. support not only risks American entanglement but could also push Iran closer to anti-Western powers like Russia and China, thereby intensifying global tensions. He frames these outcomes as structural consequences of power politics, not as inevitable catastrophes.

Yet, the situation is further complicated by the ideological dimension. The Islamic Republic of Iran, while benefiting from modern science and strategic partnerships with Russia and China, is fundamentally guided by a rigid, theologically rooted worldview. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei consistently frames Iran’s opposition to Israel in terms drawn from the 1979 Islamic Revolution’s anti-imperialist ethos. He has described Israel as a “cancerous tumor” destined for removal, predicting its demise within 25 years (a timeline he set in 2015). Khamenei calls for Israel’s “elimination” through a referendum involving all Palestinians—Muslims, Christians, and Jews—while expelling “Zionist thugs” like Netanyahu. This rhetoric echoes that of his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, who viewed Zionism as a Western-imposed regime oppressing Muslims.

It is important to note, however, that Khamenei claims to distinguish between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. He asserts that Iran is “not against Jews” and that eliminating the “Zionist regime” refers to abolishing the state structure, not targeting Jewish people. Critics, including Israeli officials and organizations like the ADL, argue that this language nonetheless veers into antisemitism by delegitimizing Jewish self-determination and invoking Holocaust-era tropes. Khamenei’s emphasis on “jihad” and resistance is framed as support for Palestinian self-determination, not direct Iranian conquest.

From a realist perspective, this ideology serves strategic functions: it mobilizes domestic support (though recent events suggest this narrative is losing traction), legitimizes Iran’s proxy networks (the so-called “Axis of Resistance”), and raises the costs for Israel to act militarily. Ultimately, Iran’s ideological posture is not purely religious; it is deeply intertwined with geopolitical survival, as the regime perceives U.S.-backed Israel as an existential threat.

In sum, while Mearsheimer’s realism provides a powerful lens for understanding the structural dynamics at play, the interplay of ideology, alliances, and nuclear risks cannot be discounted. These factors both shape and are shaped by the underlying power politics, making the Iran-Israel standoff a complex and potentially explosive regional dilemma.