Essay 08

Akbar Ganji’s essay, first published in Foreign Affairs in August 2013 and later republished, provides a detailed yet arguably biased intellectual and biographical profile of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Ganji, an Iranian dissident and former political prisoner, delves into Khamenei’s worldview, which continues to shape Iranian policy even under more moderate presidents like Hassan Rouhani. The essay contends that Khamenei’s deep-seated mistrust of the United States—rooted in historical U.S. interventions in Iran and broader anti-imperialist ideologies—poses significant obstacles to diplomatic progress, necessitating substantial mutual concessions for any improvement in relations.

Ganji traces Khamenei’s formative years in the 1950s and 1960s, a period marked by Iran’s U.S.-backed monarchy under the Shah, widely regarded by opposition figures as a puppet regime. As a seminary student, Khamenei engaged with secular intellectuals and absorbed anti-Western discourses such as “Westoxication,” a concept popularized by thinkers like Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati, who criticized Western imperialism for undermining indigenous cultures. Khamenei also drew inspiration from Western literature, including Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables and John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, to highlight the hypocrisies of capitalism. Additionally, he was influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s Islamist ideas, which advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state to achieve justice and equality, and viewed the U.S. as promoting a diluted form of Islam to counter communism.

Key historical events following the 1979 Revolution—such as the U.S. embassy hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq War (with U.S. support for Iraq), and perceived failed compromises like nuclear suspensions—further entrenched Khamenei’s belief that the U.S. seeks regime change in Iran through economic pressure, media manipulation, and proxy conflicts. Ganji presents Khamenei as a critic of liberal democracy and the materialistic decline of capitalism, citing events like the 2008 financial crisis. However, Khamenei is not entirely anti-Western; he values Western science and innovation while advocating for a “religious democracy” that incorporates spiritual elements.

The essay highlights Khamenei’s warnings against “color revolutions,” such as the 2009 Green Movement, which he views as U.S.-orchestrated plots. He insists that meaningful negotiations require the U.S. to abandon threats, sanctions, and interference in Iran’s internal affairs. Ultimately, Ganji argues that improved U.S.-Iran relations depend on Iran providing nuclear transparency and the U.S. lifting sanctions and renouncing regime change, all within a broader regional security framework.

The essay incorporates Marxist-leaning opinions, anti-Western sentiments, and potential historical inaccuracies. It reflects anti-imperialist themes and leftist critiques, referencing anti-capitalist literature and Third World liberation movements. Ganji presents Khamenei’s views through a lens critical of Western actions, which some may interpret as biased or selective in its historical framing—emphasizing U.S. roles in coups and wars while downplaying internal Iranian dynamics. Nevertheless, Ganji frames his work as an analytical portrait rather than overt advocacy.

CONCISE POINTS:

• Khamenei’s Absolute Authority: Since assuming the role of Supreme Leader in 1989, Khamenei has exercised overarching control over Iran’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches. His personal worldview and ideological convictions consistently shape national policy, often superseding the influence of elected officials, including the president.
• Formative Influences: Khamenei’s outlook was molded by pre-revolutionary anti-imperialist sentiment, the writings of secular intellectuals such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati, exposure to Western literature highlighting social injustice, and the Islamist theories of Sayyid Qutb, who advocated for an Islamic state in opposition to Western hegemony.
• Historical Grievances with the U.S.: Khamenei interprets key events—the 1953 CIA-backed coup, the 1979 embassy crisis, U.S. support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, and post-9/11 American policies—as a pattern of persistent American attempts to undermine Iran through sanctions, propaganda, and engineered revolutions.
• Critique of the West: He regards Western capitalism and liberal democracy as fundamentally hypocritical, materialistic, and in decline. While acknowledging Western scientific and technological achievements, Khamenei insists that Islamic civilization offers a superior model for spiritual fulfillment and social justice.
• Nuclear and Diplomatic Stance: Khamenei rejects the pursuit of nuclear weapons as contrary to Islamic principles. He remains open to diplomatic engagement, provided the U.S. ceases threats and recognizes Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear enrichment. However, he views previous Iranian concessions—such as those under President Khatami—as having led to increased Western pressure rather than genuine compromise.
• Path to Improved Relations: Khamenei envisions progress through reciprocal actions: Iran’s transparency with the IAEA in exchange for sanctions relief and a U.S. commitment to non-interference. Over the long term, sustaining the regime’s legitimacy may require the incorporation of more democratic elements into Iran’s political system.

Khamenei’s Early Intellectual Influences

During the 1950s and 1960s, Ali Khamenei’s formative years were marked by a diverse engagement with literature and political thought. His intellectual development was shaped by a blend of Western classics, Iranian thinkers, and ideological works that contributed to his evolving anti-imperialist worldview.

Engagement with Western Literature

Khamenei has often cited Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables as a particularly influential work, describing it as a “book of wisdom” that powerfully exposes the social injustices inherent in capitalist societies. He reportedly read the novel multiple times and publicly recommended it, highlighting its enduring relevance. In addition to Hugo, Khamenei expressed admiration for other Western authors, such as John Steinbeck, whose novel The Grapes of Wrath similarly critiques exploitation and economic inequality. These readings reflect his interest in literature that addresses themes of social justice and the plight of the oppressed.

Exposure to Soviet and Socialist Realist Works

Khamenei’s literary interests also extended to Soviet-era authors, including Mikhail Sholokhov, whose works exemplify socialist realism and often glorify revolutionary struggle. He acknowledged reading Russian literature from the Stalinist period, a time sometimes described as the “lowest point in Russian letters” due to its heavy-handed ideological content. These books typically emphasized class conflict and revolutionary zeal, sometimes endorsing harsh or violent tactics in the pursuit of social change.

While Khamenei engaged with literature produced under Stalinist influence, he has framed his interest as rooted in their critiques of Western materialism and social injustice, rather than as an endorsement of Stalinist ideology or methods. There is no direct evidence that he read Stalin’s own theoretical writings on Marxism-Leninism. Instead, his exposure to these works reflects the broader leftist and anti-imperialist currents that were influential among Iranian intellectuals in the decades leading up to the 1979 revolution.

Khamenei’s early intellectual journey reflects a complex and often conflicted personal landscape, shaped by exposure to both Western and socialist critiques of inequality and oppression. This diverse foundation played a significant role in forming his anti-imperialist outlook and influenced the intricate nature of his subsequent political and religious leadership.

Khamenei’s Leadership and Endorsement of Violence

Since assuming the role of Supreme Leader in 1989, Ali Khamenei has wielded ultimate authority over Iran’s political, judicial, and security institutions. Central to his power is command over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a force repeatedly accused of orchestrating harsh crackdowns on domestic dissent. Under Khamenei’s leadership, the state’s response to public protests has been marked by widespread repression, with security forces employing violence to suppress uprisings—particularly in the past decade as demonstrations have grown in frequency and scale.

Khamenei’s support for “violent behaviors toward Iranian citizens” is well-documented in reports from human rights organizations and independent observers. During major protests, such as those in 2009, 2017–2018, 2019, and the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini demonstrations, security forces—including the IRGC, Basij militia, and police—have been implicated in the use of live ammunition, mass arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Khamenei has consistently framed these protests as foreign-orchestrated plots, publicly endorsing the use of force and granting security agencies broad latitude to restore order. Critics argue that this rhetoric not only justifies but actively enables brutality against civilians.

Involvement of Foreign Militias

Iran’s influence extends beyond its borders through the sponsorship of regional militias such as Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces), the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun Brigades, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. These groups are primarily deployed in external conflicts—most notably in Syria and Iraq—to advance Tehran’s strategic interests. While mainstream human rights organizations attribute most of the protest-related violence within Iran to domestic security forces, there are persistent, though limited, reports from dissident sources and independent media suggesting that foreign fighters have occasionally been used as auxiliaries by the IRGC during periods of intense unrest. Notably, during the 2019 fuel protests and the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini demonstrations, some accounts allege the presence of Afghan and Iraqi fighters supplementing Iranian forces, potentially to bolster numbers and obscure direct accountability. However, these claims remain less substantiated than the well-documented involvement of the Basij and police.

Death Toll and Human Rights Abuses

The human cost of protest suppression under Khamenei’s rule is staggering. Estimates of fatalities from anti-regime demonstrations vary widely due to government censorship and restricted access for independent observers. As of early 2026, reported death tolls from ongoing unrest range from 538 (Iran Human Rights) to over 2,500 (various activist groups), with some unverified claims—including those aggregating casualties from broader crackdowns since 2019—reaching as high as 12,000 to 20,000. The 2019 protests alone saw an estimated 1,500 killed, according to a Reuters investigation. In addition to deaths, thousands have been arrested, subjected to torture, or executed, as documented by Amnesty International and other organizations. The regime’s systematic targeting of protesters, journalists, and activists underscores a pattern of state violence and impunity.

This record of repression has fueled widespread accusations of authoritarianism and state brutality, sharply contrasting with portrayals of Khamenei as a principled anti-imperialist. For example, Ganji’s essay emphasizes the ideological roots of Khamenei’s leadership, focusing on his opposition to Western influence and his vision for an independent Iran. However, critics argue that such analyses are selective, overlooking or excusing the regime’s violent suppression of dissent and the suffering of ordinary Iranians. The persistence of these abuses under Khamenei’s rule remains a central point of contention in debates over his legacy and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Sayyid Qutb as a Role Model

Sayyid Qutb, the influential Egyptian Islamist thinker executed in 1966, played a pivotal role in shaping the ideological foundations of many revolutionary movements across the Muslim world, including the Iranian Revolution. His writings, particularly Milestones, called for the establishment of an Islamic state to eradicate jahiliyyah—a term he used to describe the moral and spiritual ignorance he saw in both Western societies and secular Muslim regimes. Qutb’s vision justified not only defensive but also offensive jihad, advocating for the use of violence against oppressive rulers and foreign influences deemed hostile to Islam.

Qutb’s ideology, often referred to as Qutbism, has had a far-reaching impact, inspiring a range of Islamist movements and extremist groups worldwide. Central to his thought is the belief that true sovereignty belongs to God alone, and that armed struggle is a legitimate—and sometimes necessary—means to achieve divine governance. This uncompromising stance resonated deeply with figures like Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who saw in Qutb a model for resisting Western imperialism and secularism.

Khamenei engaged directly with Qutb’s legacy by translating his works into Persian, thereby introducing his ideas to a broader Iranian audience. He drew extensively from Qutb’s critique of Western “soft Islam”—a diluted, apolitical version of the faith promoted by the United States and its allies—to delegitimize foreign influence and reinforce the revolutionary ethos of the Islamic Republic. For Khamenei, Qutb embodied the spirit of steadfast resistance against both external domination and internal corruption.

However, this adoption of Qutb’s radicalism has not been without controversy. Critics argue that Qutb’s rhetoric of violence and uncompromising struggle has provided ideological cover for the Islamic Republic’s harsh domestic policies, including the suppression of dissent and the justification of systemic violence. They contend that the leadership’s embrace of Qutbism is evidence of an inherent brutality and intolerance for pluralism within the regime.

In sum, the influence of Sayyid Qutb on Khamenei and the broader Iranian revolutionary movement illustrates a complex interplay between anti-Western resistance and the legitimization of authoritarian practices. While Ganji’s essay offers valuable insights into these intellectual influences, it may, understate the profound human costs associated with the implementation of such ideologies.

Corruption, Executions, and Poverty Under the Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s governance has faced persistent and intensifying criticism for systemic corruption, human rights abuses, and economic mismanagement. These issues have become more pronounced under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rule (1989–present), with recent 2026 reports highlighting a deepening economic crisis as a catalyst for widespread protests. Chronic corruption and mismanagement have exacerbated poverty and social unrest, fueled public anger and demanded for reform.

Executions: A Global Outlier

Iran consistently ranks among the world’s top executioners, second only to China, according to Amnesty International and other human rights organizations. In 2024, Amnesty recorded 853 executions in Iran—an eight-year high—primarily for drug-related offenses, political dissent, or ambiguous charges such as “enmity against God.” The pace of executions accelerated further in early 2025, surging by 75% compared to the previous year. Ethnic minorities, including Kurds and Baluchis, are disproportionately targeted. Public executions remain a grim spectacle, with at least 88 carried out since 2011. Human rights groups estimate that tens of thousands have been executed since 1979, including the mass prison killings of 1988, which United Nations findings implicate Khamenei and other officials in crimes against humanity.

By contrast, under the Pahlavi monarchy (1941–1979), executions were significantly lower. The Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, is linked to approximately 300–500 political killings, though torture and disappearances were widespread. The 1979 revolution itself resulted in 2,000–3,000 deaths during clashes, but the scale of state-sanctioned executions has dramatically increased under the Islamic Republic.

Corruption: Entrenched and Widespread

Iran ranked 151st out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, reflecting severe and entrenched corruption, particularly within government and elite circles. Billions of dollars are siphoned off annually through nepotism, patronage networks, and enterprises linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Chronic corruption and economic mismanagement are widely cited as key drivers of ongoing protests and public discontent.

While corruption existed under the Shah—most notably through royal family wealth accumulation and favoritism—it was less systemic and less visible in global rankings. The Pahlavi era saw rapid economic growth fueled by the oil boom, and international perceptions of Iran’s economy were generally more positive, with less emphasis on endemic graft.

Poverty: Worsening Crisis

As of early 2026, more than 40% of Iranians live below the poverty line, according to World Bank estimates. The situation is aggravated by international sanctions, soaring inflation (exceeding 50% annually), and high unemployment (estimated at 15–20%). These economic hardships have sparked repeated waves of protest, with demonstrators demanding urgent reforms and an end to “crushing social divisions.”

During the Pahlavi era, poverty rates declined significantly—from around 50% in the 1950s to approximately 20% by 1979—thanks to modernization efforts and oil revenues. The Shah’s “White Revolution” land reforms aimed to address rural poverty and earned international praise, though inequality and authoritarianism persisted.

Comparative Overview: Pahlavi Era vs. Islamic Republic

• International Relations: The Shah’s regime maintained strong alliances with Western powers, particularly the United States, resulting in robust economic ties, fewer sanctions, and greater global integration.
• Political Prisoners: While the Pahlavi era saw tens of thousands of political detainees, the post-1979 period has witnessed a dramatic increase in arrests and executions. Over 20,000 people were reportedly detained during recent protests alone, and cumulative executions since 1979 far exceed those under the Shah.
• Public Perception: The Islamic Republic’s record on human rights, corruption, and economic management has led to growing domestic and international condemnation, with many Iranians expressing nostalgia for the relative stability and prosperity of the pre-revolutionary era, despite its own authoritarian excesses.

The Islamic Republic’s legacy is marked by systemic corruption, a soaring execution rate, and deepening poverty, all of which have fueled persistent unrest and calls for change. While the Pahlavi monarchy was far from free of abuses, the scale and severity of repression and economic hardship have intensified under the current regime, leaving Iran increasingly isolated and its population in crisis.

Iranian Involvement in Regional Atrocities

Under the leadership of Ali Khamenei, Iran has significantly expanded its influence across the Middle East through the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” a network of proxy groups and allied militias. While Iranian officials often justify these interventions as efforts to counter U.S. and Israeli influence, international observers and human rights organizations have repeatedly criticized Iran for its role in enabling widespread violence and contributing to severe humanitarian crises.

Syria

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has been a principal supporter of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has deployed its own forces and orchestrated the recruitment and deployment of foreign proxy fighters, including the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division and various Iraqi militias. Iran has funneled billions of dollars in financial and military aid to Assad, playing a decisive role in the regime’s survival. This support has been linked to numerous atrocities, such as mass killings, systematic sexual violence, and prolonged sieges that have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians. A founder of the IRGC has even compared Khamenei to Assad, labeling both as “brutal dictators with war crimes” to their names.

Iraq and Lebanon

In Iraq and Lebanon, Iran has exerted substantial influence through groups like Hezbollah and militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah. These organizations have shaped local politics and fueled ongoing conflicts, often engaging in attacks against civilians, U.S. military personnel, and rival sectarian communities. Analysts note that the tactics employed by these proxies often mirror the repressive and violent methods used by the Iranian regime domestically. Iran’s support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah has also been implicated in major incidents, including the October 7, 2023, attacks, which have prompted lawsuits in the United States against the Iranian government for its alleged role in facilitating terrorism.

These regional interventions are rooted in Khamenei’s uncompromising vision of political Islam and the export of Iran’s revolutionary ideology. However, the pursuit of these objectives has come at a significant cost. The financial and human resources devoted to foreign conflicts have strained Iran’s economy and contributed to growing domestic dissatisfaction. Many Iranians have expressed frustration over the government’s prioritization of regional ambitions over pressing social and economic needs at home, fueling protests and deepening internal divisions.

Iran’s involvement in regional conflicts under Khamenei has been marked by a pattern of supporting proxy groups accused of grave human rights abuses. While these actions are often justified as resistance to foreign intervention, they have resulted in widespread suffering, destabilized neighboring countries, and exacerbated Iran’s own internal challenges.

Akbar Ganji’s Perspectives and Underlying Biases

Akbar Ganji, once a regime insider and now a prominent dissident, offers a critical analysis of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s worldview in his 2013 essay. Ganji’s critique centers on the anti-Western and anti-imperialist influences that shaped the post-revolutionary Iranian leadership. However, he notably refrains from a thorough examination of the human costs and repressive outcomes that followed the 1979 revolution. This omission has drawn criticism from observers who argue that Ganji’s analysis is colored by lingering biases from his revolutionary past. During the revolution, Ganji and many of his contemporaries harbored deep animosity toward the Shah, whom they viewed as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. This perspective, some suggest, continues to inform Ganji’s selective focus, leading him to romanticize the ideological roots of the revolution while glossing over the subsequent purges, executions, and suppression of dissent that marked the theocratic regime’s consolidation of power.

Ganji’s references to the “elite and intellectuals” of 1979—figures such as Ali Shariati—underscore the anti-imperialist fervor that animated the revolution. Yet, he largely overlooks the fate of these very intellectuals, many of whom were later marginalized, imprisoned, or executed by the new regime. Critics contend that Ganji’s narrative thus risks perpetuating a mythologized version of the revolution, one that highlights its emancipatory aspirations but neglects its authoritarian aftermath. This selective memory, they argue, reflects a broader tendency among some former revolutionaries to valorize the ideological origins of the movement while minimizing its darker legacies.

Marxist Influences on 1979 Iranian Intellectuals and the Enver Hoxha Connection

The intellectual landscape of 1970s Iran was profoundly shaped by Marxist thought, which many revolutionaries blended with Islamist ideas in their opposition to the Shah’s regime. Organizations such as the Fedayeen-e Khalq (Marxist guerrillas) and the Mojahedin-e Khalq (initially a Marxist-Islamist hybrid) played pivotal roles in the revolutionary movement. However, after the revolution, these groups were swiftly sidelined, suppressed, or purged by the ascendant theocracy. This “Iranian irony” saw leftist forces ally with Ayatollah Khomeini against imperialism, only to become victims of the very regime they helped bring to power.

Within this context, Enver Hoxha, the Stalinist leader of Albania from 1944 to 1985, emerged as a symbolic figure for anti-revisionist Marxists worldwide, including in Iran. Hoxha’s writings, such as Imperialism and the Revolution (1979), offered scathing critiques of U.S. imperialism and celebrated Third World revolutionary movements. His works were translated and circulated among Iranian leftists, and Hoxhaist factions regarded him as a steadfast opponent of both Soviet and Chinese “revisionism.” Hoxha’s analysis of the Iranian Revolution was notably positive: he traced its anti-imperialist roots back to the 1953 coup and urged Iranian Marxist-Leninists to guide the revolution’s trajectory. Some Iranian groups, particularly Hoxhaist splinters, even venerated him as a “true hero” of the global left.

In retrospect, the fascination with Hoxha and Albania’s isolated brand of Stalinism is often viewed as a fringe phenomenon, even a subject of ridicule. Nevertheless, it highlights the eclectic and sometimes contradictory currents that animated the Iranian left in 1979. The interplay of Marxist, Islamist, and anti-imperialist ideologies produced a revolutionary coalition that was both dynamic and unstable—one whose internal contradictions would soon become tragically apparent as the new regime turned on its former allies.

On Ganji’s Essay as a “Convoluted Version of the Truth” from the 1920s Onward

Ganji’s analysis, is rooted in a selective historical perspective that foregrounds anti-imperialist narratives—most notably, the 1953 U.S.-backed coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh. He frames Khamenei’s worldview as a rational, if defensive, response to a century of Western intervention and betrayal. This approach traces a line from Reza Shah’s modernization efforts in the 1920s, through the oil nationalization crisis, to the Pahlavi dynasty’s complex alliances with foreign powers. However, Ganji’s account arguably underemphasizes the significance of internal dynamics: the clerical establishment’s own ambitions, the revolutionary purges following 1979, and the regime’s systematic consolidation of power through repression and exclusion of rivals.

Viewed from the vantage point of 2026, with the benefit of hindsight on pivotal events—the brutal suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, the deadly 2019 fuel protests (with over 1,500 killed), and the ongoing unrest from 2022 to 2026 over women’s rights and economic collapse—Ganji’s essay reads less as a comprehensive reckoning and more as an intellectual biography. It offers insight into why Khamenei perceives the world as he does, particularly his deep-seated paranoia about “color revolutions” and foreign plots but stops short of fully interrogating how this mindset has justified and perpetuated systemic violence and repression.

Critics might label the essay “convoluted” because it humanizes Khamenei by exploring his intellectual influences and formative experiences yet fails to give equal weight to the immense human cost of his rule. This imbalance can make the analysis feel incomplete or even apologetic in retrospect. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that Ganji, himself a former political prisoner and outspoken dissident, was not a regime apologist. His likely intent was to inform Western policymakers about the psychological and ideological barriers to negotiation with Iran’s leadership, rather than to offer a sweeping condemnation or exoneration. The result is a nuanced but partial account—one that illuminates the roots of Khamenei’s worldview but leaves the full reckoning with its consequences to others.

Comparisons to Violent Dictators and Their “Talents”

Throughout history, the personal talents or intellectual pursuits of violent dictators have rarely softened the brutality of their regimes. In fact, such attributes often served to intensify their ideological fervor and the sophistication of their repression. For example, Joseph Stalin, who wrote poetry in his youth and later edited literary works, and Adolf Hitler, an aspiring painter whose watercolors still circulate today, both channeled their creative or intellectual energies into constructing elaborate justifications for their atrocities. Their regimes were not less cruel for these talents; rather, their cultural and intellectual interests provided a veneer of legitimacy and a deeper ideological framework for their violence.

Iran’s leaders, Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor Ali Khamenei, fit a similar mold, though with notable differences. Unlike Stalin or Hitler, neither Khomeini nor Khamenei displayed significant original artistic creativity. Khamenei’s well-publicized admiration for Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables—which he translated and praised for its social justice themes—appears less as a sign of genuine literary engagement and more as a calculated appropriation. He selectively co-opts anti-capitalist motifs from Western literature to reinforce the rhetoric of the Islamic Revolution, without producing any original cultural output of his own. Khomeini, for his part, wrote mystical poetry, but it was deeply rooted in Shia eschatology and served to reinforce sectarian ideology rather than promote universal humanism.

Exposure to works like Hugo’s, which champion empathy and rebellion against injustice, might be expected to foster compassion. Yet, this was not the case for Khamenei. His record—overseeing mass executions (with Iran ranking second only to China in the number of executions), orchestrating forced confessions, and supporting proxy wars that have claimed thousands of lives—demonstrates a profound disconnect between literary appreciation and moral conduct.

The Cult of Infallibility and Self-Divinization

Where the parallel with 20th-century dictators truly holds is in the construction of a cult of infallibility and self-divinization. Stalin presented himself as the embodiment of the proletarian will; Hitler, as the divinely chosen Führer; Pol Pot, as the architect of a purified Year Zero; Mao Zedong, as the “Great Helmsman” surrounded by a personality cult. In Iran, this phenomenon is institutionalized through the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). Khomeini declared himself the deputy of the Hidden Imam—a messianic figure in Shia Islam—claiming ultimate religious and political authority as God’s representative on earth. Khamenei inherited and expanded this mantle, wielding unchecked power and demanding absolute loyalty.

This is not mere rhetoric; it is embedded in the very structure of the Iranian state. Dissenters are branded as apostates or foreign agents, providing religious and legal justification for severe repression, including the infamous 1988 prison massacres, in which an estimated 4,000–5,000 political prisoners were executed based on religious decrees (fatwas). Such actions reflect a criminal delusion of grandeur—an echo of the worst excesses of 20th-century totalitarianism. The result is a system both absurd in its self-importance and tragic in its human cost.

Why Ganji’s Essay Sounds “Wrong and Ridiculous” Today

Viewed from 2026, Ganji’s 2013 essay on U.S.-Iran relations and Supreme Leader Khamenei now reads as awkwardly optimistic, if not outright naive. Written in the hopeful aftermath of Rouhani’s election, the essay posited that addressing Khamenei’s suspicions—such as by lifting sanctions in exchange for nuclear transparency—could open a path to détente with the West. At the time, this seemed plausible, especially as the JCPOA negotiations gained momentum. However, thirteen years later, the essay’s tone and assumptions feel disconnected from the harsh realities that have since unfolded.

Since then, the landscape has dramatically shifted. The collapse of the JCPOA, the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, and Iran’s deepening alliances with Russia and China—especially in the context of the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts—have all contributed to a hardened, more isolated regime. Far from moderating, the Islamic Republic has doubled down on repression and regional aggression. Ganji’s portrayal of Khamenei’s anti-Westernism as principled rather than paranoid now seems misplaced. Recent years have seen the regime back Assad’s war crimes in Syria, arm the Houthis in Yemen, and brutally suppress domestic dissent, with over 20,000 arrests during the latest wave of protests. These actions reveal a leadership that is not only rigid but increasingly violent and unaccountable.

If Ganji were to revisit his essay today, he would almost certainly address these developments. As a dissident in exile, he has continued to critique the regime in later writings, focusing on issues like succession and human rights. Yet, his 2013 piece remains a time capsule—valuable for its insights into Khamenei’s worldview but ultimately prioritizing explanation over outrage. It fails to anticipate the regime’s descent into outright brutality and the deepening misery of ordinary Iranians, who now face poverty, isolation, and relentless repression.

Ganji’s Ideological Proximity to Shariati and Soroush

There exists a discernible intellectual lineage connecting Akbar Ganji to both Ali Shariati and Abdolkarim Soroush, two of the most influential figures in modern Iranian thought. Characterizing Ganji as “closer” to Shariati is justified, given their shared roots in the revolutionary era and their mutual engagement with the intersection of religion, politics, and anti-imperialism.

Ali Shariati, often celebrated as the “ideologue of the Iranian Revolution,” synthesized Shia Islam with Marxist sociology and Third World anti-imperialism. He famously framed religion as a vehicle for liberation against Western hegemony, a message that resonated powerfully in 1970s Iran. However, Shariati’s selective reinterpretation of Islamic texts to fit leftist and anti-colonial agendas has drawn criticism for bordering on intellectual opportunism.

Ganji has explicitly engaged with Shariati’s legacy, both critiquing and drawing from his ideas. While Ganji positions himself as a post-revolutionary reformer rather than a direct disciple, he shares Shariati’s anti-authoritarian stance and skepticism toward Western intervention. Ganji’s early journalism and dissident writings often echo Shariati’s concept of “Westoxication,” portraying U.S. and Western influence as existential threats to Iranian sovereignty. Yet, unlike Shariati, Ganji is more critical of ideological dogmatism and advocates for reform within the system rather than revolutionary upheaval.

The intellectual proximity between Ganji and Abdolkarim Soroush is even more pronounced. Both emerged as leading “religious intellectuals” during the 1990s reform movement, advocating for a hermeneutic and pluralistic approach to Islam that challenges theocratic absolutism. Soroush, sometimes called the “Ayatollah’s scholar in America” due to his exile and early regime ties, has been a major influence on Ganji’s thought.

Soroush’s writings on “religious democracy” and the separation of religious truth from political power have directly shaped Ganji’s calls for human rights, secular governance, and intellectual freedom. Both have been criticized as compromised reformers due to their past associations with the Islamic Republic (Ganji’s IRGC background, Soroush’s support for Khomeini), yet both have evolved into vocal critics of the regime’s authoritarianism. Ganji has frequently referenced Soroush in his discussions on modernity, freedom, and the challenges of reconciling Islamic tradition with contemporary values.

Shared Limitations and the Search for Authentic Alternatives

Together, Shariati, Soroush, and Ganji represent a distinctive strand of Iranian thought: progressive within Islamic frameworks, yet often hesitant to fully embrace Enlightenment ideals such as secular democracy and universal liberalism. Instead, they prioritize the search for “authentic” Iranian and Islamic alternatives to both Western liberalism and domestic authoritarianism. This approach has allowed them to challenge the status quo while maintaining cultural legitimacy, but it also limits their ability to advocate for a complete separation of religion and state or for the wholesale adoption of Western political models.

Ganji’s intellectual trajectory is deeply intertwined with those of Shariati and Soroush. He draws on their critiques of authoritarianism and Western imperialism, adapts their reformist impulses, and shares their ambivalence toward Western liberalism. Yet, he also carves out his own space as a post-revolutionary thinker, seeking to reconcile Iran’s revolutionary legacy with the demands of modernity and pluralism.

In summary, this observation is both sharp and unflinching: intellectual rationalizations cannot absolve leaders who govern as self-anointed autocrats. While Ganji’s essay remains a reasonable introduction to the psychological underpinnings of Iran’s leadership, it critically underplays the regime’s entrenched brutality and its profound aversion to reform. As public dissent persists and economic conditions worsen, the essay’s initial optimism appears increasingly anachronistic—a sobering testament to how swiftly aspirations for change can be eclipsed by the intransigence of authoritarian power.